There is a great deal of talk today about racism. It is imputed to individuals and whole groups. Often now if you say you are not a racist, this will earn the accusation that you are in fact a racist, but your racism is so deep in you that you can’t see it. Most of us are supposed to be guilty of some form of racism, even if it is only implicit, or “systemic” as they say, in the class or region or religion with which we identify.
What is more, we are supposed to make reparation for this materially or politically or socially or professionally or even by physical violence. This is evidently to be decided by those who make the accusation, of which we are expected to be guilty, there being no presumption of innocence in the case of this charge.
Obviously, this state of affairs makes discussing racism difficult, since some of us feel unreasonably accused of it, others feel unreasonably the objects of it, and others appoint themselves judges and juries. So, let’s clarify the matter far from the daily news, fake or real, and apart from any mere political correctness anywhere on the spectrum of opinion.
What exactly is racism?
Before there can be any discussion of racism, we should define what we mean by the term; otherwise, there is no sense in any further evaluation of the broader practice and effects of racism in past or present history.
Our definition is really two. These defining marks are usually found together, but not always:
1. Racism is an error contrary to the deposit of faith that denies the unity of the human race created in the image and likeness of God and the dignity of each human being for whom Christ shed his precious blood on the cross on account of the differences within that human race of ethnic or racial identity.
2. Racism is an error opposed to justice that judges another human being rashly or by mere suspicion and thereby deprives him of what is due him in virtue of this dignity on account of the differences of ethnic or racial identity within the human race.
From these errors we may immediately infer the truth of the following:
3. Racism so defined, if consented to by a person’s own fault, is a sin, grave in the case of the virtue of faith, and light or grave in the case of justice, depending on the matter of the injustice.
And we may infer less obviously but quite correctly:
4. Racism as sin against faith always implies the sin against justice. Racism as a sin against justice can be committed without the sin against faith.
This definition of ours is a Catholic one, but it could be shared by other serious Christians. This means that we are defining in line with revealed truth in faith and morals. In other words, as noble as the affirmations of our American Declaration of Independence are, they are not the source, or in any way the beginning, of our Catholic understanding, even if they are mostly in accord with it.
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration, was a great statesman and elegant writer, but he was hardly divinely inspired. (On the contrary, he produced his own edited version of the Gospels from which he removed those passages with which he disagreed!) Rather, we go to the sources of revealed truth, Sacred Scripture and Tradition. Indeed, we go to Our Lord Jesus Christ, the ultimate source of our understanding, and our supreme and effective example.
Now, let us consider each of these four clarifications in the light of the Church’s authoritative teaching in faith and morals.
An error against faith
At the beginning of World War II, on October 20, 1939, the venerable Pope Pius XII published the first encyclical letter of his reign. It is called from its first words Summi Pontificatus, and it may be found for the diligent inquirer in various languages under that name on the Vatican website (vatican.va). There is much else covered in this letter that concerns other matters that are also urgent today—for example, the limits of the authority of the secular state and the rights of the family—so the reader is encouraged to read the entire encyclical.
The pope describes the various errors afflicting the world. The first of them was the error of racism. He does not use the word racism, but he describes it and contrasts it with the truth of revelation from Genesis to the Epistles of St. Paul:
The first of these pernicious errors, widespread today, is the forgetfulness of that law of human solidarity and charity which is dictated and imposed by our common origin and by the equality of rational nature in all men, to whatever people they belong, and by the redeeming sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ on the altar of the cross to his heavenly Father on behalf of sinful mankind (SP 35).
Thus we have a unity based on a common origin described in Genesis and thus on an equality of rational nature (here we can see where Jefferson got his idea of “all men created equal”) and on the redemption of the whole human race, living and dead, in the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.
Racist theories of human beings superior or inferior by nature are always based on this denial of a common origin. They are based on materialistic or idealistic notions of bodily or historical evolution. The evolution of the human species when conceived in this materialist or idealist manner always leads to racism, the denial of a common human dignity.
The pontiff goes on:
A marvelous vision, which makes us see the human race in the unity of one common origin in God “one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all” (Eph. 4:6); in the unity of nature which in every man is equally composed of material body and spiritual, immortal soul; in the unity of the immediate end and mission in the world; in the unity of dwelling place, the earth, of whose resources all men can by natural right avail themselves, to sustain and develop life; in the unity of the supernatural end, God himself, to whom all should tend; in the unity of means to secure that end. . . .
In the light of this unity of all mankind, which exists in law and in fact, individuals do not feel themselves isolated units, like grains of sand, but united by the very force of their nature and by their internal destiny, into an
organic, harmonious mutual relationship which varies with the changing of times (SP 38, 42).
Far from denying or deploring the racial and ethnic differences within the human race, Pius XII insists that these differences are included in its unity and can serve to build it up in charity. In fact, the pope teaches that the denial of the value of this diversity leads to a lessened unity. Ethnic diversity is a strength, not a weakness, in the unity of humanity. It is only when its importance is exaggerated that it can harm this unity (cf. SP 43-45).
Licit preferential love
But this awareness does not deny the importance of the order of charity in which we love our own nation and even our own kind with a preferential love. Their interests are our own, saving the rights and dignity of other races and nations. The pontiff even uses the example of the Savior’s preferential love for his Jewish people:
Nor is there any fear lest the consciousness of universal brotherhood aroused by the teaching of Christianity, and the spirit which it inspires, be in contrast with love of traditions or the glories of one’s fatherland or impede the progress of prosperity or legitimate interests. For that same Christianity teaches that in the exercise of charity we must follow a God-given order, yielding the place of honor in our affections and good works to those who are bound to us by special ties. Nay, the Divine Master himself gave an example of this preference for his own country and fatherland as he wept over the coming destruction of the Holy City. But legitimate and well-ordered love of our native country should not make us close our eyes to the all-embracing nature of Christian charity, which calls for consideration of others and of their interests in the pacifying light of love (SP 49).
Clearly and elegantly the pope has described a right view of the human race in its variety of ethnicities and nations. Any other doctrine that denies human equality and asserts the natural social superiority of some nations over others is contrary to the revealed truths of faith in our creation and in our redemption. It is not Catholic.
This does not mean, however, that the various peoples cannot progress and improve or regress and be corrupted in comparison with each other. It does mean that this progress or regression is dependent on the acceptance or rejection of the revealed truth about human nature. Those who have progressed are not permitted to exploit or oppress those who have not. They are rather bound to seek their improvement while respecting their human and social dignity.
Here we are not interested in distracting the reader from the basic understanding of what racism is. Thus, we are not bringing forth historical examples from the past or present so as not to muddy the question by passions and opinions about these things. There was chattel slavery and slave trade in the American North and South in the past, and there is human trafficking here now, as well as our dependence on slave labor in the clothing industry and manufacturing abroad—and of course the obvious context of National Socialism in the Third Reich, which was the context of Pope Pius’s encyclical.
But we can notice that the pope teaches his doctrine serenely in a way applicable to all forms of racism. This apolitical approach is wise, since we cannot know what to do unless we have clear fundamental ideas to begin with. The Church with its deposit of faith does not need to stir up passions or offer mere opinions; it offers the pure truth from which can be directly inferred a sound judgment of present or past examples of racism. It is not debating but teaching. When we absorb its teaching, we develop a Catholic instinct of discernment of the things we see and hear and experience.
An error against justice
This is a good transition to our consideration of racism in the practical order. Racism is an error against the virtue of justice. Here we will find the most personally challenging doctrine. There is something in it for everyone. The Church’s tradition has made the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas its own, especially his teaching on the virtues and the vices opposed to them. So we will follow his teaching that the Church uses in the Catechism of the Catholic Church and in its evaluation of servants of God who are to be declared blesseds or saints.
Justice is the virtue by which we are disposed to give to each human person what is due him. There are acts and tendencies that oppose the different kinds of justice. One of them is called rash judgment or judgment by suspicion.
We turn to Aquinas’s treatise on justice. In the article of his Summa Theologiae in which the saint deals with judgment by suspicion—which he defines as “evil thinking based on slight indications” (II-II, 60, 3)—Aquinas cites three sources of suspicion.
The first is a man’s own wickedness whereby he is prone to think evil of others; this we might call nowadays projection. The second is being badly disposed to another by hatred, anger, or envy. He implies that this is frequent because everyone believes easily his own emotions. The third is because of more or less long experience of the one suspected. This kind of suspicion is still a judgment based on slight indications, but because it is based on experience, it is closer to certainty, which is the opposite of suspicion.
In any case, any judgment based on suspicion “denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.” So, all things being equal, the third cause is the least vicious, the second more vicious, and the first the most vicious.
From these three causes flow the three different ways in which one may judge and act based on mere suspicion. Each degree is worse than the next:
Now, there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another’s goodness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light sin; for “it belongs to human temptation without which no man can go through this life,” according to a gloss on 1 Corinthians 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one’s neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to say: “If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion.” The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.
The degree of conviction of the truth of the judgment rooted in suspicion determines its sinfulness. Here we arrive at the actual practice of racism.
Racism in practice
Racism as being an error against justice judges with suspicion persons who differ from ourselves solely on account of their race or ethnicity. If this judgment is not fully formed or is only a tendency, it is a light fault since it only “begins” to doubt of another’s goodness or value based on a tendency and is not a fully conceived conviction. If the judgment by suspicion is based on a person’s subjective but passion-driven certainty, it amounts to contempt and so is gravely wrong.
Here we have what is really and truly the vice of racism, for such an attitude if acted upon will certainly lead to grave injustices. At this point the reader can easily examine himself to see if he has ever in thought, word, or deed so seriously injured the dignity of another. Most clear examples of genuine racism in individuals or institutions would be of this kind. Thus, Aquinas tells us that we must “restrain our judgment and refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion.” Otherwise we err gravely, a thing far worse than our worst suspicions of others.
The extreme example of this vice is found in the third degree of judgment by suspicion, when a judge condemns someone on account of his race or ethnicity. This is the worst form of racism, since it uses the very court of justice to commit injustice. A society afflicted with this evil is mortally damaged by its racism and will eventually pay the price in the suffering of the innocent and the guilty—if not here then hereafter.
We can see the obvious connection between the second degree of racist suspicion and the third, since judges and legislators have to have the second-degree fault in order to commit the third. We should keep in mind that, for Aquinas, being a judge in the legal sense means anyone who holds civil or ecclesiastical office for the common good. For us today this would mean anyone in any branch of government, not only those in what we call the judicial branch, and anyone who exercises jurisdiction in the Church, from confessors and parish priests all the way to bishops, cardinals, and popes. In this area we can examine our consciences about the way we vote on persons and ballot issues, our practice of prayer for our hierarchs, and even of our expressing our concerns to them.
From this treatment of the error of racism as being against justice, we can easily see the point of our third characterization of racism insofar it may be a subjective sin. All that is needed is the deliberate consent to the error of racism, whether as an error against faith or against justice.
The fourth defining point should be very clear. Very few Catholics are racists in the ideological sense—that is, insofar as racism denies the faith. If any of us are racists, it is almost always by the unjust judgments we form and by which we may sin against justice venially or mortally, even if we have not denied our faith in the unity of the human race redeemed by the Savior.
Sin through thought
We sin by thought, word, and deed. Thus, it is not only actions based on unjust suspicion that are sins. This is the case with sins of thought especially. It is quite possible to sin by racism in thought only, as it is to sin against the ninth or the fifth commandment by thought. So, we need to examine our consciences in thought as well as deed. We may find more faults there than elsewhere.
So there can be a sin of racist thoughts as there is a sin of impure thoughts or hostile thoughts: something to consider seriously. We are bound to try to judge others as good, unless their faults are proven facts, even with a lingering but unproven suspicion. Aquinas says:
When we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves.
Notice that even if our positive judgment is incorrect, there is no evil in it, since our feelings are kind, and, importantly, our mind does not require us to have an exhaustive knowledge of individuals. We do ourselves no harm in judging someone to be better than he actually is. Thus, the person tempted to racism is bound to try to distrust his suspicions. In this way we avoid sin and may find more of the truth in our kind judgment than in our suspicion.
We will find that praying for those of other races whom we suspect and dislike will help in this. After all, we have the example of our Divine Lord who, when faced with the whole weight of this world’s sin, prayed for those whose sins so deeply hurt him: “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!”
Even so, we sometimes have to take measures in which we assume the worst of others. In these cases, we judge on a supposition based on experience and to prevent evils, not on our suspicions that increase evils. Thus, Aquinas clarifies the case in these words:
One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another’s, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil.
Thus, certain defensive measures—such as security systems on houses, or cautioning our children not to go unaccompanied into dangerous neighborhoods where there may be moral or physical dangers, or possessing a firearm for protection—are actions that interpret things for the worst. But this is only to prevent an evil, not to cause one. Such approaches are not evil, rash judgments but are based on the experience that we are justified in avoiding possible evils without doing an injustice to anyone else.
The bottom line, however, is that we should as much as possible interpret things for the best. As the Lord Jesus says, “Judge not, lest you be judged, for with what measure you judge it will be measured back to you” (Matt. 7:1-2). If we despise or degrade our neighbor based on his race or ethnicity, then we will always find that there are others who will do the same to us.
The evil one hates the unity of the human race in Christ the Lord and seeks to destroy it. Let us love this unity, and then we will think of racism as Christ does and begin to love our neighbors as he loves us all.
Sidebar: What’s Truly Deplorable
A politician a few years back described the supporters of the opposing side who shared a common ethnic identity as “deplorables.” As Catholics, seeking to conform to the faith and morals taught by the Church, we are not deplorables. But if we commit the sin of racism, by our false teaching and unjust attitudes we would deserve the name.
Racism is truly a deplorable error. It leads to hell on Earth with wars and violent destruction. It leads to hell after death after unrepentant racists receive the final just judgment: “I know you not.” A racist does not seek truly to know the ones he despises, and so he is not acknowledged by the One who made both him and them and who died on the cross for both without discrimination “that all may be one.”