Have you ever tried to persuade someone that your belief was true, and that person responded, “Well, there is no truth,” or “It might be true for you, but not for me”?
This way of thinking, called relativism, is an impediment to any sort of rational dialogue. Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, called it the “most profound difficulty of our time.”
And it’s a worldview that has taken hold in the minds of many young people. Allan Bloom, in his influential work The Closing of the American Mind, observed, “There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative” (25).
How can we argue for the truth of a belief if truth is not real? It’s impossible.
So, in order to engage in any discussion about truth, the obstacle of relativism must be overcome. But how do we do this?
Distinctions upon distinctions
First, we need to make some distinctions, because relativism comes in many different shapes in sizes. There are two broad categories of relativism: global relativism and local relativism. (This division was taken from Edward Feser’s article “The Absolute Truth About Relativism”.)
Global relativism involves relativistic claims about truth in general. Whether we’re talking about morality, science, religion, history, etc., global relativism states there are no absolute truths whatsoever. No belief or opinion is true independent of what an individual or a society happens to think.
“What’s true for you might not be true for me,” the global relativist says. For global relativism, all types of beliefs are either true or false relative to an individual or society’s set of beliefs.
The second category of relativism is local relativism, which involves relativistic claims about truth in particular domains, such as morality, science, religion, history, etc.
For example, a local relativist might say, “I believe absolute truth exists when it comes to things like math (2+2=4) and science (gravity is real). But when it comes to things like morality (e.g., ‘Don’t have sex before marriage’) or religion (e.g., ‘Christianity is the true religion’), what’s true is relative to what the individual or culture thinks.”
The version of local relativism that we’ll be considering in this article is moral relativism: the assertion that no moral claim is absolutely true but only relative to the individual or the culture.
Now that we’ve made the necessary distinctions, we can begin our critique of relativism. Let’s start with global relativism.
A critique of global relativism
The fundamental problem with the claim that there is no absolute truth is that it’s self-defeating, like a snake devouring its own tail. We can show this by simply asking, “Is it absolutely true that there is no absolute truth?”
If the relativist answers yes, then there would be at least one absolute truth: the statement that there is no absolute truth. But, of course, this would prove global relativism false, in which case it would be true to say there is absolute truth.
Moreover, to say that it’s absolutely true that there is no absolute truth violates the principle of non-contradiction, a first principle of reason that states something cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. Inasmuch as global relativism entails a self-contradiction, it can’t be true. Consequently, it’s contradictory, and “There is absolute truth” is true.
A global relativist isn’t going to go down so easily, though. There are a few ways that he might respond.
No true or false statements
First, he might say, “Your objection doesn’t work, because it presupposes what I am denying—namely, truth and falsity.”
The problem with this response is that it undermines the assertion of any statement, including the statement, “I deny that truth or falsity exists.” If a statement about reality cannot be true or false, then it would be nothing more than a bunch of sounds void of meaning or semantic content—like a grunt or a moan. As such, the statement, “There is no absolute truth” would be unintelligible.
Furthermore, these unintelligible sounds couldn’t be inconsistent with our belief that there is truth. To say meaningless sounds are logically inconsistent is nonsense. Therefore, a relativist can never meaningfully say, “There is no such thing as absolute truth.”
Relativity of global relativism
Another way a global relativist might respond is to say that his claim, “There is no absolute truth,” is only relatively true. But this is problematic as well.
The relativist’s use of the verb is implies an assertion about the objective order of things. It suggests conformity to reality. The relativist is suggesting that the statement “There is no absolute truth” really is relatively true. But this is the same thing as saying, “It’s absolutely true that there is no absolute truth,” which, as we saw, is a contradiction.
But this response has another problem. It trivializes the belief of global relativism. What could a relativist mean by saying, “Global relativism is relatively true,” except that global relativism happens to be one belief among many within his personal set of beliefs that has no bearing on reality for other people?
If that’s what he means, then his belief is nothing more than a personal taste or preference, a report about what he happens to like or dislike, such as his flavor preference for ice cream. But why should we be concerned with what he likes or dislikes? There is nothing more that we can say than, “That’s interesting. Thanks for sharing.”
Moreover, that global relativism is true for him and not for others doesn’t tell us something we don’t already know. Since we already know that some people don’t think global relativism is true, the global relativist’s position is trivial and uninteresting.
Doubting the principle of non-contradiction
There is one last counter a global relativist might employ: deny the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). Recall above that we said one of the reasons why global relativism is false is because it violates the PNC. To say global relativism describes the way the world really is amounts to saying, “It’s absolutely true that there is no absolute truth.”
But notice this critique assumes the truth of the PNC. So, if a global relativist is determined to save his position, he might deny the validity of the PNC.
There aren’t too many who would be so radical as to deny the PNC. But there are enough to justify a defense.
Defending a first principle
The PNC is a first principle of knowledge, which means its truth is not derived from the truth of any prior principles. Its truth inheres in the principle itself, and thus cannot be logically demonstrated—a way of showing that something is true by using a syllogism (e.g., All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal).
However, we can defend the PNC by showing how if you want to deny it, you necessarily have to use it. This is the chief mark of any first principle.
We can show this in three ways.
1. Intending the meaning of your denial
First, a PNC skeptic can speak against the PNC only if his words (“The PNC is false”) have their intended meaning and not their contradictory meaning (“The PNC is not false”).
For example, if a PNC skeptic says, “The PNC is false,” he must intend that statement to mean what it expresses and not the contradictory statement “The PNC is not false.” If a PNC skeptic affirmed the contradictory proposition—“The PNC is not false”— he would be affirming what he set out to deny, in which case his denial of the PNC would be self-defeating.
So, a PNC skeptic must intend to mean what his initial statement expresses (“The PNC is false”) and not its contradiction (“The PNC is not false”). But if he does that, he necessarily assumes that he can’t affirm at the same time both “The PNC is false” and “The PNC is not false.”
But for a PNC skeptic to think that he can’t affirm two contradictory statements at the same time is to presuppose the validity of the PNC, which again undermines his initial attempt to deny the principle.
So, a skeptic’s denial of the PNC ultimately ends in self-defeat since he can’t deny it without using it.
Perhaps a PNC skeptic could remain silent. Would that save a PNC skeptic from the above dilemma? The answer is no, for even understanding what is meant by the principle presupposes its truth. The cognitional content must have the intended meaning and not its contradictory.
2. Contradictory evidence
Another way to show how we can’t deny the PNC without using it is to point out that a PNC skeptic only attempts to deny the PNC because he thinks he found some evidence that contradicts it.
But if a PNC skeptic believes some evidence contradicts the PNC, then he necessarily assumes it’s impossible for the evidence to both contradict the PNC and not contradict the PNC at the same time. For if that were possible, then the evidence wouldn’t contradict the PNC, and thus our skeptic friend would have no reason to doubt the principle.
Now, to assume that it’s impossible for the evidence to both contradict and not contradict the PNC at the same time is to also assume that you can’t affirm at the same time two contradictory states of being. But, of course, these assumptions can be made only if the PNC is true.
Once again, it’s impossible for someone to deny the PNC without presupposing its truth.
3. To be or not to be
There is yet another (and more fundamental) way to defend the PNC against its deniers. Consider the fact that for a skeptic to deny the PNC, and intend for us to take him seriously, he must believe that he exists. If a PNC skeptic believed he didn’t exist, then we would have no reason to consider his denial of the PNC. That should be pretty clear!
If the PNC denier believes that he exists rather than that he does not exist, then he believes it’s impossible for him to both exist and not exist in the same respect at the same place and time. But someone can believe this only if they first believe that the PNC is true. Therefore, you can’t deny the PNC without using it.
Because the PNC is a first principle of knowledge, it belongs to the very fabric of the mind’s activity. It governs all rational thinking. As such, rational beings (human, angel, and even God himself) cannot escape it. Someone may be able to deny it verbally, but he cannot be mistaken about it in thought.
Since it’s logically impossible to deny the PNC, and global relativism violates the PNC, it follows that global relativism is false. And, as we said above, if global relativism is false, then it’s contradictory “that there is absolute truth” is true.
The logical incoherence of moral relativism
With global relativism proven false, let’s now turn to moral relativism. Moral relativism at first glance is not as easy to refute. The reason is because it’s not self-refuting.
It’s perfectly coherent to say that there are absolute truths in some domains of inquiry, such as science, but not all domains, such as morality. To say that there are some absolute truths but no absolute moral truths is not self-defeating as is global relativism.
Although the content of moral relativism is not self-undermining, when you think it through, you discover it has several pitfalls.
A moral relativist who wants to be coherent will not simply say that moral relativism is true. Instead, he’ll say that we must live in a way consistent with it. (Otherwise, what’s the point?) He’ll say, for instance, that we shouldn’t “impose our morality” on other people, since they might have their own moral truth that’s different from ours but just as valid.
But as soon someone says that we shouldn’t do something (like impose our morality), or that we ought to live in a certain way (a way consistent with moral relativism), he’s asserting at least one absolute moral truth, isn’t he?
But there can’t be no absolute moral truths and at least one absolute moral truth at the same time!
So, although moral relativism by itself is not self-refuting, it is self-refuting to say that we should live in accord with moral relativism.
Negative moral evaluations not allowed
There is another problem with moral relativism. This one hits closer to our common human experience.
Consider that to live as if moral relativism were true would involve not making any negative moral judgments about someone’s behavior. For example, if Jack rapes Jill, we would have no grounds within the framework of moral relativism to criticize Jack for his behavior, since he could easily assert that his behavior is morally good for him.
As moral relativists, all we could say is that what Jack did runs counter to our moral belief. But why should Jack care what we like and don’t like? He certainly doesn’t seem to be the type of person who would put other people’s beliefs and feelings before his.
Someone might object that what Jack did is wrong because he harmed Jane or because he coerced her to do something she didn’t consent to. But this would undermine moral relativism, since it assumes as true the moral principle that we shouldn’t harm someone or do something without consent.
A partial-moral relativism
At this point, our friend might resort to a sort of partial-moral relativism and say, “Well, morality is absolute when our actions affect other people (interpersonal morality), but relative when our actions affect only ourselves (personal morality).”
Even if for argument’s sake we concede this principle, we don’t always follow it in practice. Take the intent to murder, for example. Suppose my neighbor plots to murder me but for some reason is unable to carry out his plan. Suppose that I never find out.
In no way would my neighbor’s deliberations have involved me except in his thoughts. And if my neighbor’s actions didn’t affect me, then, according to the above partial-moral relativism, we couldn’t judge his intent to murder as wrong. But all people will agree that it’s wrong to plot someone’s murder even if circumstances prevent it from happening.
No moral partiality
Despite the fact that we don’t always follow the above ethic, there is reason to doubt the principle itself. For example, why should we even believe that only interpersonal morality is absolute and personal morality is relative? It’s a totally arbitrary—and self-serving—principle. A relativist has to defend this idea, not just assert it as though it were self-evident.
Furthermore, am I not a person also? If morality is absolute when it comes to my interaction with other people, why is it not when I interact with myself? If it’s wrong for me to stop other human beings from achieving the ends to which their nature directs them, it should be wrong for me to stop myself from achieving those same ends.
Another problem with this distinction is that it’s hard to think of any action that someone might do that in no way affects someone else at least indirectly.
A man who views pornography, for example, even though he does so all by himself, trains himself to view women as objects to be used for his own sexual gratification. Surely, that’s going to affect the way he relates to other women in reality.
We praise authorities for arresting people who view child pornography, even if they’re doing it in secret, in part because we recognize that this “private” activity has indirect public effects: tacitly supporting an exploitative industry and potentially affecting the way they treat children in reality.
I suppose if someone were the only human being left on Earth, his actions would affect only himself. But that’s a scenario for science fiction, not the real world.
So, if we say that we must live in accord with the truth of moral relativism, we forfeit any grounds on which we can make any negative moral judgments. If we try to split hairs and say that only personal morality is relative, we run into the reality that we are social beings whose moral choices inevitably affect others.
Not for reasonable human beings
At first glance, moral relativism might seem like a safer bet than global relativism. But when you think it through, it becomes clear that neither is a position that a reasonable human being ought to embrace.