Philosophy and theology are integrally linked. Our philosophical assumptions have a huge impact on the range of theological conclusions we draw. With that in mind, it is important that Catholic apologists be aware of some common philosophical errors that have a bearing on our faith. There are five in particular that I hear most frequently. Apologists should know these mistakes and how to refute them.
1. Faith has nothing to do with reason. Reason builds from certain scientific evidence, whereas faith is based on sentiment and feeling.
Faith and reason are not the same, but Catholics believe that both our faith and our ability to reason are gifts from God. Both faith and reason are given to us so that we can know the truth about reality. Since truth cannot contradict truth, so also faith cannot contradict reason and vice versa. The Holy Father, in his encyclical Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason), calls faith and reason two wings on which the human spirit rises to God. Far from being based on feeling and sentiment, faith is reasonable and sure.
There are two distinctions obscured by the above philosophical error. First, there is a distinction between what is reasonable in itself and what is reasonable to us. Those things we know by faith—such as that God is a Trinity or that Jesus has a divine and a human nature—we know to be reasonable in themselves or reasonable in principle, because we know them by the authority of God, who reveals these things to us. The knowledge of God is a much surer foundation on which to build than on the conclusions of mere human reason. Some things, such as the above mysteries of the faith, are not reasonable to us right now because we do not fully understand them. We cannot say for sure, though, that they are not reasonable, because they are matters that surpass our competence. We know them to be reasonable on the basis of God’s authority through the instrument of his instruction, the Church.
Second, there are distinctions between types of knowledge. For instance, there is knowledge from mathematics, from natural science, from metaphysics, and from the data of revelation. The proponents of this philosophical error want to admit only the first two types of knowledge and sometimes only the first. Such selectivity is arbitrary and self-defeating, since it is impossible to justify merely on the basis of mathematics or natural science why mathematic or scientific knowledge are the only admissible types of knowledge.
Faith has its reasons. Most believers will say that faith makes sense based on their experiences. Sophisticated believers will say that the findings of philosophy, science, and mathematics all point to the reasonableness of faith. While it is true that it is impossible for us to provide a geometric proof for the Trinity of God or to use scientific methodology to verify that Christ has two natures, there is no reason for us to limit ourselves to these means.
2. God’s existence cannot be known from science.
This statement is correct only if we operate from a very crude notion of what science is. If science is only that body of knowledge that we collect by studying things directly—by touching, hearing, or otherwise directly sensing the object of our study—then we cannot know God from science. God is not material, and human beings can use only our five senses to experience material things.
If we broaden our notion of science to include knowledge of things that we get from observing their effects on other things, then God can be known from science. There are two legitimate reasons for so broadening our notion of science.
First, scientists study objects based on their effects on other objects. Scientists can deduce the existence of other planets in a far away solar system even though the only object we directly experience is the star in the system. The scientist will look for a wobble in the star’s position. Far and away the most likely explanation for the wobble is that there is at least one object orbiting that star, the gravitational pulls of which tug on the star enough to produce a noticeable wobble.
Second, we never directly experience a sensible object anyway. When we see a ball, it is not the ball we have direct access to but rather a series of interactions between light reflected from the ball and collected in our eyes, processed by our nerves, and recorded in our brains. We experience the effect the ball has on the light, the effect the light has on our nerves, and the resulting image in our brains. Our senses are designed to study objects by their effects, not to g.asp objects themselves. There is no reason that we should not be able to apply these same principles to the study of the effects of God.
Thomas Aquinas formulated five ways of knowing the existence of God. The two easiest to g.asp are the argument from design and the argument from the conditionality of the universe. The argument from design states that a thing exhibiting a high degree of order, intelligibility, and purpose must have been designed by a mind. Our universe is such a thing. Therefore, the universe must have been designed by some mind. This, as Aquinas would say, we call God. The argument from the conditionality of the universe states simply that it is conceivable that the universe might not have been. There seems to be nothing in the essence of the universe that demands that it exist by necessity. Therefore, there must be something greater, something that is not itself conditioned (or it would fall prey to the same uncertainty of being) that grounds the universe in being. That thing is what we call God.
3. Darwinism has done away with the need for God as an explanation for the existence of life.
The materialist philosopher of science Richard Dawkins is famous for having stated that Darwinism makes it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist. Even granting the truth of macro-evolution, the scantly supported theory that species change their morphology so radically due to survival pressures as to become altogether new species, Dawkins will still have to look for fulfillment elsewhere. Darwinism is a theory about how living organisms adapt and change due to environmental pressures. Where there is no life, Darwinism is inapplicable. In other words, Darwinism does not explain how life began in the first place. As Dr. Robin Bernhoft has shown, the chances of amino acids combining randomly to form even one short protein strand are so unlikely as to make the claim that this happened ridiculous to the point of absurdity (see “Confronting Creation’s Complexities,” This Rock, September 2003). This leaves alone the chances of that protein forming with other proteins into strands of RNA or DNA, which provide the basis for life.
Further, Darwinism is self-defeating. If human beings have evolved by natural selection, then we cannot know the truth about Darwinism. Darwin’s theory of natural selection states that a species’s attributes will develop in response to environmental pressures in such a way that those attributes that equip the organism for survival will evolve.
This means that humans’ faculties—including those allowing them to develop theories like Darwinism—must have evolved because they are oriented toward survival, not toward knowing the truth about reality. There are situations in which not being attuned to reality would increase the chances of survival. There are many necessary tasks that are made more difficult, and therefore less likely to succeed, because of a realistic knowledge of the situation, such as defending oneself, one’s family, or one’s home against great odds. So, if our faculties are oriented toward survival and not toward the truth about reality, then we cannot know the truth about Darwinism.
4. God cannot be at the same time all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing if evil exists.
This mistake is made frequently by people seeking to undermine the foundations of theism. As we shall see, it has no merit because it operates on a false assumption.
The argument goes that the God of theism would want only good for his creatures. Evil exists, though, and so God can have two of the attributes listed above, but not all three. He can be all-powerful and all-loving but not know how to do away with evil. He can be all-loving and all-knowing but unable to do anything about evil. He can be all-powerful and all-knowing but also unwilling to do anything about evil.
By saying God wants only good for his creatures, the anti-theist will mean that God will not want evil to come to them. Yet evidently evil does come to his creatures. This is where the mistake lies. If there is a higher good that God can secure by permitting evil, then he will do so. For the Christian, the higher good that justifies the existence of evil may be the freedom to love.
A brief story will help to illuminate this point. God created a race of beings with no elbows and sat them down at two tables with only very long spoons and loaded the tables with good food to eat. They could not feed themselves because of the strange utensils and their lack of arm joints. The first table cursed God for giving them such wonderful things to eat but depriving them of any means to eat them. The second table, though, discovered that their spoons were just long enough to feed the person sitting across from them. This table discovered loving community based on mutual assistance and praised God both for the wonderful food and for their newfound friends. This would not have happened if God had not given them the obstacle to overcome.
Of course, God’s answer to the problem of evil is not a philosophical demonstration but the passion and death of his Son. Christ, as the ultimate innocent, experienced the ultimate evil in his unjust rejection and execution. If God himself finds evil for love to be a good tradeoff, it should not be too hard for us to swallow.
5. Human beings are not qualitatively different from animals.
This mistake is made by most materialist philosophers and by some of the more radical members of the animal rights movement. If animals are not qualitatively different from humans, then animals must be treated very differently both in ethics and in law. Fortunately, they are wrong.
There are three obvious areas where we can see that human beings occupy a more elevated position than other animals. First, human beings use language, and animals do not. Some animals can be taught by a system of conditioning to manipulate a limited set of symbols in response to stimuli from their trainers. So, for example, Kanzi the bonobo can respond to a command by his trainer, “Put on the shoes,” by putting on the shoes. Kanzi has been trained to do so. When the trainer tells Kanzi to “put the keys in the refrigerator,” Kanzi does so, because he has been conditioned to respond to the stimulus of her voice to perform that specific action.
But what would even a toddler say if his mother asked him to put the keys in the refrigerator? “Silly mommy, keys don’t go in the fridge!” The toddler understands the meaning of the keys and the fridge and the function of each. Because of this, the toddler understands why it is inappropriate for the keys to go in the fridge and finds such a command nonsensical. The bonobo ape exhibits no such understanding.
Second, humans and animals react differently when their basic needs are met. When a man’s basic needs are met, he often turns to other pursuits, such as cultural activities, or he may have time to experience anxiety (i.e., “What if my needs were suddenly no longer met?”). When an animal’s basic needs are met, it produces no culture. It goes to sleep. Whoever heard of an alienated dog? The animal kingdom has no Jean-Paul Sartre or Blaise Pascal.
Third, human beings are capable of making moral decisions. It would make no sense to accord animals standing as moral subjects if they are unable to act morally. A chimpanzee cannot understand laws or moral norms. If it cannot act morally, it should not be treated with the same moral regard as a being who can act morally.
Of course, a human child is also not capable of acting morally until a certain age. But the human child eventually will develop his latent moral faculties. One of the ways these faculties develop is by treating the child morally. In sharp distinction, it is impossible to imagine that, by treating a chimp morally, the chimp would develop into a moral agent.
There are, of course, many other philosophical mistakes out there. But, armed with responses to these five very common mistakes, you should be in good shape. Remember that you cannot compel faith through reason. Even if you’ve dealt with these mistakes, faith is still a gift. What you can do is remove obstacles to make it easier to accept that gift.